Showing 1 - 4 of 4 Items

Traders and Troublemakers: Sovereignty in Southern Morocco at the End of the 19th Century

Date: 2020-01-01

Creator: Joseph Campbell Hilleary

Access: Open access

This thesis explores changes in and challenges to Moroccan political authority in the region of the Sous during the late nineteenth century. It attempts to show how the phenomenon of British informal empire created a crisis over Moroccan sovereignty that caused the sultan to both materially and discursively change the way he wielded power in southern Morocco. It further connects these changes and the narrative contestation that accompanied them to the construction of the Bilad al-Siba/Bilad al-Makhzan dichotomy found in Western academic literature on Morocco starting in the colonial period. It begins with an examination of letters between Sultan Hassan I and local leaders in the Sous that show a shift toward a more bureaucratic form of governance in response to repeated openings of black-market ports by British trading companies. It then investigates the textual debate over the framing of Hassan I’s military expeditions to southern Morocco in the 1880s and 90s by drawing on a collection of European travel accounts, American consular reports, and a royal Moroccan history. Finally, it ties the illegal trade in the Sous to the broader theory of informal empire through a close examination of the Tourmaline Incident of 1897, using documents from the British Foreign Office as well as published accounts by crew members aboard the Tourmaline, itself.


From “This Revolution is Neither Communist nor Capitalist!” to “Long Live the Socialist Revolution:” The Deterioration of U.S.-Cuban Relations from 1958-1961

Date: 2023-01-01

Creator: Julia Lyne

Access: Open access

This thesis studies the deterioration of U.S.-Cuban relations from 1958-1961. Mainly drawing from primary sources from the National Archives, it seeks to answer and understand how and why relations deteriorated so rapidly. It pushes against the common belief that U.S.-Cuban relations were doomed from the start, instead highlighting in Chapter One Fidel Castro’s rise to power (and Fulgencio Batista’s fall from power) and revealing that the U.S. government was not entirely against Castro’s seizure of power. Chapter Two explores Castro’s first year in power and the (futile) attempts made by both governments to keep relations alive. Finally, it closes with the destruction of official and unofficial relations, suggesting that President Eisenhower’s covert approval of the invasion of the Bay of Pigs marked the covert ending to political relations as well as rising economic and political tensions due to an incompatibility of demand and interest in the sugar and oil industries. Ultimately, this thesis suggests that it was not just a matter of communism that led to the destruction of U.S.-Cuban relations at the time; instead, it was because of compounding effects of other various other economic and political factors and incompatibilities, such as the sugar and oil industries, public and political slandering and attacks from both sides, and an increasing acceptance of the Soviet Union and its supporters. This analysis does not seek to argue against the influence of communism in its entirety; rather, it aims to highlight and nuance the contributing factors to this deterioration.


Reconsidering Operation Condor: Cross-border Military Cooperation and the Defeat of the Transnational Left in Chile and Argentina during the 1970s

Date: 2014-05-01

Creator: Georgia C Whitaker

Access: Open access

In this study of the roots of Operation Condor, I track the development of this unusual military alliance forged by six Southern Cone governments (Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Uruguay, and Paraguay) during the 1970s, as well as the push-and-pull relationship between the transnational migration of political militants and the military’s impetus for collaboration. While most accounts of Condor focus on the United States as the operation’s primary orchestrator, I contend that initial motivation for the type of cooperation that Condor would later formalize was driven not by the U.S., but by the Southern Cone militaries’ perception that Marxism had to be excised from the entire region. In addition, while Condor scholars have either ignored or minimized the role of the left as political actors and placed the blame for violence exclusively on the militaries and the United States, I draw from unpublished Argentine police records, Argentine Embassy documents, and Chilean-Argentine solidarity group publications to argue that it is essential to broaden our understanding of what both sides in this ideological confrontation were attempting to accomplish. The transnational left, never a homogenous group, evolved to meet a variety of objectives. Many militants continued to be politically active while they were in exile, and many acted in solidarity with like-minded leftists in their midst.


Un Sión tropical: el general Trujillo, Franklin Roosevelt y los judíos de Sosúa

Date: 2014-01-01

Creator: Allen Wells, Natalia Sanz González, (translator)

Access: Open access

Setecientos cincuenta refugiados judíos dejaron la Alemania nazi y fundaron la colonia agrícola de Sosúa en la República Dominicana, que en ese momento estaba bajo el régimen de uno de los dictadores más represivos de Latinoamérica, el general Rafael Trujillo. En este libro, Allen Wells, hijo de uno de los colonos de Sosúa, cuenta la historia del general Trujillo, Franklin Delano Roosevelt y los afortunados pioneros que fundaron, en la costa norte de la isla, una exitosa cooperativa de productos lácteos de propiedad de los mismos empleados. ¿Por qué el dictador admitió a esos desesperados refugiados cuando muy pocas naciones aceptaron a los que escapaban del nazismo? Ansioso de mitigar las críticas internacionales después de que su Ejército masacrara varios miles de haitianos desarmados, Trujillo mandó a sus representantes a una conferencia sobre los refugiados del nazismo realizada en Évian, Francia, en 1938. Propuesta por Roosevelt para desviar las críticas a las políticas restrictivas de inmigración de su Gobierno, la Conferencia de Évian resultó un completo fracaso. La República Dominicana fue la única nación que aceptó abrir sus puertas; el oportunista Trujillo buscaba “blanquear” la población dominicana, recibiendo refugiados judíos, quienes en Europa eran ellos mismos sujeto de desprecio racista. Debido a que los Estados Unidos no admitieron números significativos de refugiados judíos, alentaron a Latinoamérica a aceptarlos. Esta propuesta, sumada a la preocupación mayor de Roosevelt de luchar contra el nazismo, fortaleció las relaciones estadounidenses con las dictaduras latinoamericanas en las décadas que vendrían.